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Introduction
More than 350 years ago, ships of the Dutch
West-Indian Company sailed into St. Anna
Bay, Curacao and conquered the Island from
the Spanish. Soon the island became a strong-
hold for buccaneers and a depot for the
flourishing Dutch slave trade. In the course
of time, the colony of Curacao grew to
encompass the Islands of Aruba and Bonaire
and the Dutch Leeward Islands (St. Maar-
ten1, Saba and St. Eustatius) situated more
than 900 kilometres further north (see Fig. 1).
Although one of the first Dutch colonies,
eventually the Dutch West Indies could not
compete with the Dutch East Indies in terms
of its importance to the Dutch economy.
Nevertheless, the Dutch West Indies ironi-
cally represent the last remains of Dutch
colonialism after the independence of Indo-
nesia in 1949, the transfer of Western New
Guinea to Indonesia in 1963 and the inde-
pendence of Surinam in 1975.
Table l shows that in both population size
and surface area Curacao is the most impor-
tant island, followed by Aruba. The official
language on all the Islands is Dutch. How-
ever, the lingua franca on the Leeward Is-
lands is English, and on Curacao, Aruba and
Bonaire it is Papiamentu, a language derived
from a mixture of Portuguese, Spanish,
Dutch, English and various African lan-
guages which spread from Curacao.
* Department of Human Geography, Faculty of Envi-
ronmental Sciences, University of Amsterdam,
Nieuwe Prinsengracht 130, 1018 VZ Amsterdam, The
Netherlands.
Throughout this text, the term 'the An-
tilles' refers to all six islands, but because
Aruba was separated politically from the
other five islands in 1986, this group of
islands is referred to as 'the Netherlands
Antilles'.
In recent years, GNP per capita in Aruba
has risen considerably to about $13,000 in
1990. In the Netherlands Antilles it has been
lower, i.e., $7,500 in 1988 (Kabinet 1991;
BNA 1988). This makes Aruba a high-income
country according to World Bank Standards.
Its GNP per capita is greater than Spain's and
comparable to New Zealand's. According to
the same Standards the Netherlands Antilles
is an upper-middle income country, earning
more per capita than Portugal or Saudi Ara-
bia (World Bank 1992).
Of course, it is necessary to be aware that
in these small-scale Antillean economies
minor events may cause large fluctuations
from year to year. Moreover, GNP figures are
estimations and population figures are not
very reliable. For example, St. Maarten has
officially some 30,000 inhabitants, but is
reported to have another 30,000 illegal immi-
grants (Nieuwenhuis 1993).
Finally, although figures are lacking, in-
come distribution is highly skewed. For ex-
ample, the unemployment rate on Curacao is
still high and illegal immigrants in St. Maar-
ten are exploited in the labour market.
Politica! relationships between the Antilles
and The Netherlands
Political relationships between The Nether-
lands, the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba
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Fig l The Netherlands Antüles and Aruba
Table l Netherlands Antilles and Aruba, population
numbers and surface area
Island Area (km2) Population*
Curaeao
Bonaire
St Maarten
St Eustatius
Saba
Netherlands Antilles
Aruba
444
288
34
21
13
800
193
143,000
11,000
30,000
1,500
1,000
186,500
69,000
* estimates 1991
are laid down in the Statute of the Kingdom,
originally signed by The Netherlands, the
Netherlands Antilles and Surinam in 1954.
The Statute granted self-government to the
Dutch colonies, i.e., they have a large degree
of freedom to decide upon internal af f airs,
but defence and foreign affairs are the re-
sponsibility of the Government of the King-
dom, which is heavily dominated by the
Dutch government.
Foreign relations and defence are the main
areas where the governments of the Nether-
lands Antilles and Aruba cannot take deci-
sions independently. These areas are the do-
main of the Government of the Kingdom,
which embraces the Dutch government and
the respective Plenipotentiary Ministers of
the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba. For the
most part, both of these ministers can be
considered ambassadors of their govern-
ments in The Netherlands, but on special
occasions when matters of foreign affairs and
defence also involve the Antilles they take
part in the meetings of the Council of Minis-
ters (De Palm 1985).
Although foreign relations are taken care
of by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba also have
their own Bureaus of Foreign Relations.
These bureaus maintain day-to-day eco-
nomie and political contacts with neighbour-
ing countries and some important interna-
tional organizations.
In practice, the responsibility of the Kmg-
dom for the defence of the Antilles means
Tijdschrift voor Econ en Soc Geografie 84 (1993) No 5 379
that the Dutch Royal Navy is present in the
Antilles with a frigate, a patrol plane and a
detachment of Marines. At first sight, its
presence is symbolic. However, the govern-
ments of Aruba and the Netherlands Antilles
may call upon the Dutch Marines to maintain
law and order. In 1969 Dutch Marines
quelled an insurrection of the Proletariat on
Curacao (Rapport 1970).
The Netherlands Antilles and Aruba have
a large degree of freedom to decide which
foreign affairs affect their particular inter-
ests. For instance, their Plenipotentiary Min-
isters may put a so-called 'local veto' on any
international agreement signed by the
Government of the Kingdom, if the Nether-
lands Antilles and Aruba do not wish to take
part in it because of expected disadvantages.
If, however, this local veto threatens the
'unity' of the Kingdom, a Committee of
Dutch and Antillean Ministers, with a Dutch
majority, must endeavour to find a binding
solution. Moreover, if The Netherlands does
not agree with certain developments in the
Antilles it may, through its majority in the
Government of the Kingdom, intervene di-
rectly by an Algemene Maatregel van Bestuur
(a binding Government Order). This means
that in fact the ultimate power in the Antilles
still lies in the hands of The Netherlands (De
Palm 1985).
Even so, the spirit of equality enshrined in
the Statute, together with the ethos of com-
promise which permeates Dutch political cul-
ture, has prevented an Algemene Maatregel
van Bestuur from being unilaterally imposed
by the Dutch government over the heads of
the Antillean governments. Moreover, there
is a general feeling in Dutch politics that
relationships among the partners of the
Kingdom should serve as an example to the
world community. Ever since relations with
Indonesia were frustrated by Dutch incom-
prehension of Indonesian nationalism, it was
thought that relations with the Antilles and
Surinam should be a textbook case of an ideal
decolonization process. It is to this attitude
that the Antilles and Surinam owed their high
degree of autonomy. That is why the
intervention by the Dutch Marines in 1969,
although in line with the Statute, was re-
garded afterwards in The Netherlands as an
inadmissible act of interference in Antillean
internal affairs which The Netherlands were
forced into by the Statute. This was especially
so since the intervention aimed at defending
the political power of the old Curacao elite of
European descent against a revolt of the
Proletariat of African descent (Römer 1974;
Verton 1977).
The same attitude explains why most
Dutch politicians were happy to grant inde-
pendence to Surinam in 1975, although until
the last moment this was opposed by a very
large minority of the Surinamese population,
resulting in a substantial exodus of Suri-
namese to The Netherlands. In addition, a
military coup d'état and political instability
in Surinam a few years after independence
resulted in the suspension of Dutch develop-
ment aid to Surinam until 1988.
The Surinamese experience caused a
change in the Dutch attitude towards the
Antilles. It is now thought that the political
instability in Surinam was the result of an
insufficient maturity of the political system
that was not corrected by the Dutch because
of Surinam's high degree of autonomy. In the
light of this awareness, the Dutch are once
again starting to feel responsible for the good
governance of the Antilles. During the past
few years the possibility of a long-lasting
involvement of The Netherlands with the
Antilles, guaranteeing the economie and po-
litical stability of the islands, has been dis-
cussed extensively.
The end result is the acceptance by the
Dutch government of the Antillean desire
(supported by a majority of the Antillean
population) for an unlimited presence of the
Antilles within the Kingdom. However, the
presence is no longer unconditional from the
Dutch standpoint. The Dutch government
would like to have more influence on the local
administration of the Antilles. This political
attitude is motivated by (a) the administrative
disorder especially in St. Maarten and
Curacao, (b) the unsatisfactory debt Sit-
uation of the Netherlands Antilles which
now have a total debt of about $1.1 billion,
equal to twenty times the yearly amount of
Dutch development aid to the Antilles, (c)
reports of American and Italian mafia in-
volvement in St. Maarten and drugs smug-
gling from Curacao and Aruba, and (d) last
but not least, the increasing migration of
Antilleans who are unemployed to The Neth-
erlands. Already a complete reorganization
of the local administration on St. Maarten,
including police and justice has been en-
forced by the Dutch government. With the
approval of the government of the Nether-
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lands Antilles, a Dutch Public Prosecutor
and some Dutch constabularies are charged
with this task. Moreover, recently the Dutch
Prime Minister threatened further in-
tervention if the Antilles were reluctant to
meet other Dutch demands regarding good
governance.
Local administration and political develop-
ment within the Antilles
Every four years the population of each of
the islands elects an Island Council that nom-
inales a number of Commissioners. They are
headed by a Lieutenant-Governor appointed
by the Governor. Moreover, in 1986 Aruba
left the Netherlands Antilles to become a
separate self-governing political entity within
the Kingdom with the same status as the
Netherlands Antilles. The Island Council of
Aruba was transformed into the National
Parliament of Aruba which appoints a Coun-
cil of Ministers. Legislative power on the
other five islands, which now make up the
Netherlands Antilles, is vested in the An-
tillean Parliament which also appoints a
Council of Ministers entrusted with executive
power. Both Aruba and the Netherlands An-
tilles are each headed by a Governor, who has
the power of a ceremonial Head of State
representing the Queen of The Netherlands
and being appointed by the Government of
the Kingdom but is nominated by their re-
spective governments.
The Parliament of the Netherlands Antilles
is elected in direct elections on the
understanding that each island has a specific
number of seats in the Parliament and that
political parties from a certain island can only
compete for the seats of that particular is-
land. This system, introduced to ensure that
the interests of all individual islands are
represented at the national level and to pre-
vent the smaller islands from being domi-
nated by the bigger ones, has, however,
resulted in political fragmentation because it
hampers the rise of national political parties.
Nowadays, Parliament consists of 21 seats.
Curacao is assigned thirteen seats, Bonaire
and St. Maarten three each, and Saba and St.
Eustatius one each.
Rivalry between Curacao and Aruba dates
back decades. Historically, Curacao has been
the economie, political and demographic cen-
tre of gravity of the Antilles. The other
islands had little significance. Curacao was a
trading centre and a slave depot, but with the
declining importance of Dutch trade and the
abolition of the slave trade, it became an
economieally depressed colony in the nine-
teenth Century. lts society was segmented,
with a small elite of merchants, plantation
owners and government officials of Eu-
ropean origin on the one hand and a large
Proletariat of former slaves of African origin
on the other.
Industrial capitalism was implanted on
Curacao in 1918 when Shell established a
factory to refine Venezuelan crude for the
American market. However, a second centre
of economie gravity was created when, for
the same reasons, Lago - later taken over by
Esso - constructed a refinery on Aruba.
Both islands then experienced a tremendous
economie and demographic growth (Van
Soest 1977). Workers were recruited from all
over the Caribbean, introducing for the first
time an important Negro element into
Aruban society.
When the Statute of the Kingdom was
being negotiated, Aruba pleaded in vain for
separate status, because it feared it would be
overruled by Curacao. Power relations be-
tween Aruba and Curacao were fixed in the
allotment of seats in the Antillean Parlia-
ment, i.e., twelve for Curacao, eight for
Aruba, one for Bonaire and one communal
seat for the Leeward Islands.
As long as the old elites of European
descent in Aruba and Curacao dominated
their political parties, there was little dispute
between the islands and governing coalitions.
However, the old regime began to change
in the 1950s, when automatization in the oil
industry led to the expulsion of workers.
Many of them returned to their home coun-
tries, again reducing to some extent the Negro
element in Aruban society. On Curacao,
unemployment, mass dismissals and wage
conflicts eventually led to an outburst of
violence in 1969 bringing leaders of the Prole-
tariat of African descent onto the political
scène and even into the government at the
expense of the old elite (Verton 1977). At the
same time the emancipation process on
Aruba spawned new political leaders and
parties which breathed new life into the old
idea of separate status for Aruba opposing
the collaborative attitude of the old Aruban
parties towards Curacao.
The plea for separate status was based on
a mixture of political, economie, racial and
cultural elements. Aruba, being more suc-
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cessful in restructuring the economy than
Curacao, claimed it was paying too much tax
to the Central government compared to
Curacao, while the bulk of government ex-
penditure occurred on Curacao because all
the ministries were located there. In politics
Aruba had less seats than Curacao and was
thus dominated by the latter, and on top of
that, it was disturbed by the coming into
power of a new leadership of African de-
scent. Differences in cultural and racial roots
were stressed too: Aruba was said to have a
more Latin-American background and
Curacao more African.
After several years of administrative par-
alysis The Netherlands agreed to separate
status for Aruba as a third partner in the
Kingdom from 1986 onwards. However, in
exchange Aruba had to agree to füll inde-
pendence (outside the Kingdom) in 1996 be-
cause The Netherlands wanted to prevent the
other islands from leaving the Netherlands
Antilles and claiming separate status too.
Nevertheless, at a conference on the political
future of the Antilles in March 1993, follow-
ing the shift in political opinion explained
earlier, The Netherlands waived this Obliga-
tion. At the same time the Dutch offered
separate status to Curacao and to St. Maar-
ten, if they would agree to more Dutch
control of public finance, local administra-
tion and justice together with restrictions on
Antillean immigration in The Netherlands.
The small islands would have the same status
as municipalities in The Netherlands. Aruba
and the Netherlands Antilles have not yet
responded positively to these proposals,
which would lead to an important revision of
the Statute (Vermeulen 1993).
Economie development, development aid
and Migration to The Netherlands
OU industry — There were various reasons
why Shell and Lago started to refine
Venezuelan crude for the American market
on Curacao and Aruba. Because only small
ships could sail into Lake Maracaibo, where
the crude was produced, this meant high
transportation costs for oil shipped directly
to the USA. However, Curacao, Aruba and
Bonaire have very deep harbours where even
today the largest oil carriers can moor. So
crude was first shipped in small vessels to
Curacao and Aruba, refined and then trans-
ported in tankers to the USA.
An important additional reason was the
political stability of the Antilles under Dutch
colonial rule, making them a far more attrac-
tive locatión in which to sink large invest-
ments in refineries than in unstable
Venezuela. Both refineries developed into
huge industrial complexes of global impor-
tance. In 1941, they produced almost 85 per
cent of the allied aviation petrol. Prosperity
grew but some 80 per cent of the jobs in
Curagao and Aruba were dependent on oil
(De Haan et al. 1990).
After 1950, when more refineries were
built in the USA and Europe, the refineries on
the Antilles suffered from increasing compe-
tition. To cut costs the Antillean refineries
went through various automatization pro-
grammes reducing the number of employees
from more than 20,000 in 1952 to less than
2,000 in 1989. However, competition proved
too strong; in 1985 Esso closed down its plant
and Shell sold its refinery to the government,
which then hired out the plant until 1994 to
Petroléos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA), the
state oil Company of Venezuela, enabling this
Company to evade certain OPEC quotas. At
the moment, Curacao and PDVSA are nego-
tiating new Investment in the antiquated re-
finery and a joint venture (BNA 1991; De
Haan et al 1990). On Aruba, Coastal Oil
from Houston reactivated the old Esso refin-
ery in 1990, though on a smaller scale. In
addition the oil terminals - on Curacao,
Aruba, and also on Bonaire and St. Eustatius
- still play an important role in the distribu-
tion of crude from the Middle East, West and
North Africa to USA.
Tourism - The development of tourism was
a logical step to counterbalance unemploy-
ment caused by the restructuring of the oil
industry. Aruba has been far more successful
in this respect than Curacao. Due to continu-
ity of government policy in this field, beauti-
ful beaches and a more welcoming attitude of
the population to foreign visitors, Aruba had
already developed into a luxurious tourist
resort in the 1970s, while tourism in Curacao
lagged behind. Therefore, Aruba now has an
unemployment rate of only l .5 per cent while
in Curacao it is 16.4 per cent (Kabinet 1991;
BNA 1991). Large Investments in new hotels,
mostly American-owned, more than tripled
the capacity of hotel rooms in Aruba from
2,041 in 1986 to 7,268 in 1992. This rapid
increase endangers the profitability of the
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tourist sector. Between 1988 and 1991, the
average occupancy rate had already dropped
from 78.7 to 68.9 per cent (Kabinet 1991;
ADT 1992). Moreover, because the Aruban
government has guaranteed several loans to
finance the construction of the hotels, declin-
ing profitability may also weaken the govern-
ment's financial position.
Apart from this stay-over tourism there is
also cruise-tourism. Though spending less,
cruise-tourists are more important on
Curacao than on Aruba, due to the attrac-
tiveness of the historie, commercial centre of
Willemstad, the capital of Curacao.
Tourism is also the most important eco-
nomie activity for Bonaire and St. Maarten.
The latter has some 3,300 hotel rooms and
received more cruise-tourists than the other
Islands (see Fig. 2). St. Maarten has been
through a process of metamorphosis during
the last two decades. It is on this small island
that the disadvantages of large-scale tourism
become most apparent. Not only is tourism
extremely vulnerable to fashion and political
and economie crisis, but infrastructure on St.
Maarten such as roads, electricity and sewer-
age networks are overloaded and environ-
mental problems inevitably emerge. More-
over, local administrative capacity is not
sufficiently prepared for its role in the boom-
ing economy, resulting in administrative
chaos. This, added to the accusations of
corruption and mafia influence in sectors like
hotels/casinos and construction, has resulted
in Dutch guardianship.
The international finance sector - This so-
called 'off-shore sector' has become an im-
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Fig. 2. Stay-over and cruise-tourism in the Netherlands
Antilles and Aruba, 1980-1991.
portant source of income especially to the
island of Curacao, although its contribution
to employment, mainly in the field of admin-
istration offices, is limited. The sector found
its origin in the tax treaty between the USA
and the Kingdom of The Netherlands. Com-
panies paying taxes in the Kingdom were
exempted from taxes in the USA to prevent
doublé taxation. By charging the interna-
tional finance sector a small 2 to 3 per cent
tax, Curacao managed to attract hundreds of
firms, of ten established in the Antilles only
on paper. However, in 1986 the USA
demanded a revision of the tax treaty. Now
the Antilles are forced to charge 10.5 per cent
tax. Consequently it has become less profita-
ble for many firms to follow the 'Antillean
route'. Thus tax revenue from the interna-
tional finance sector of the island of Curacao
dropped from 55 per cent of the total tax
revenue in 1988 to 40 per cent in 1991.
Nevertheless, this sector still contributes
some 23.5 per cent to the national income of
the Netherlands Antilles and recently its for-
eign exchange earnings have recovered bring-
ing them up to second position directly after
earnings from tourism (De Haan et al. 1990;
BNA 1991, 1992). Figures for Aruba are
unavailable, but its financial off-shore gains
are important too (Kabinet 1991).
Development aid - Nowadays about 4 per
cent from the Dutch aid budget is spent on the
Antilles (DGIS 1991). Two-thirds consist of
grants-in-aid and the remainder is made
available as concessionary loans. Develop-
ment aid, each year equivalent to about 4 to
5 per cent of the Antillean GNP (BNA 1988,
1991), was spent on projects initiated by
government and local development organiza-
tions, budgetary assistance for the smaller
islands and technical assistance. Between
1962 and 1988 the Antilles, including Aruba,
received about $800 million. Virtually all
capital investments, and in practice also part
of the current expenditure, in the Antilles is
financed or guaranteed by the aid budget.
About 14 per cent went to the Central govern-
ment, 21 per cent to Aruba and 49 per cent to
Curacao and 7.5 per cent to both Bonaire and
the Leewards Islands. Of this amount 47 per
cent was directed to infrastructure (including
public Utilities, airports, harbours, bridges
and roads), 5 per cent to health and educa-
tion, 22 per cent to corporate housing, 5 per
cent to tourism and 10 per cent to industries
Tijdschrift voor Econ. en Soc. Geografie 84 (1993) No. 5 383
(BNA 1988). From this allocation it may be
concluded that government policy is mostly
oriented to creating the conditions for eco-
nomie growth rather than to directing invest-
ments. In 1991 the allocation figures for the
Netherlands Antilles, excluding Aruba, were
different from the original picture. Infra-
structure declined to 35 per cent, housing to
8 per cent, tourism to 4 per cent and indus-
tries to 8 per cent. About 45 per cent was
specified as miscellaneous, undoubtedly hid-
ing an increase in budgetary assistance. Cur-
rent government expenditure goes primarily
to salaries (43°7o), and then to goods and
services such as social welfare, education and
maintenance (33%) (BNA 1991).
The debt services of the Antilles is a major
Problem. Although the debt of the Nether-
lands Antilles has dropped since 1991, thanks
to economy measures, it still amounts to 25
per cent of GNP. In Aruba debt service is 24
per cent of GNP (BNA 1991; Kabinet 1991).
However, this concerns the foreign debt,
almost exclusively to The Netherlands. As in
most countries there is also a public sector
domestic debt, which originales from public
borrowing and also from the fact that the
statutory government contributions to the
Civil Servants Pension Fund and the Social
Security Bank have not been transferred for
a number of years. The domestic debt of the
Netherlands Antilles rose to 31 per cent of
GNP in 1991, about half of which consists of
debt of the island government of Curacao
(BNA 1991, 1992).
The total debt of the Netherlands Antilles
and Aruba is estimated to be about $1.1
billion. This equals roughly twenty times the
yearly amount of Dutch aid to the Antilles. It
is an additional reason why the Dutch govern-
ment has become rather concerned and is
anxious to streamline government finances.
Although both the Central government
and the island government of Curacao have
carried out important labour lay-off pro-
grammes to cut government expenditures
(BNA 1988), it is thought in The Netherlands
that the overexpenditure is mainly caused by
the system of political patronage in the An-
tilles, resulting in the appointment of inex-
Note:
1. St. Maarten does not belong exclusively to The
Netherlands: the northern part belongs to the French
Département d'Outremer of Guadeloupe.
pert political supporters as civil servants
every time another political party comes to
power and in the allocation of funds toward
political clientèle.
Migration to The Netherlands
Unemployment on Curacao declined from an
all time peak in 1987 of 28.9 per cent of the
labour force to 16.4 per cent in 1991 (De
Haan et al. 1990; BNA 1991). Youth unem-
ployment also dropped, but is still high at 30
per cent. The decline is due to a rise in
employment by about 15 per cent between
1988 and 1991. However, another important
factor explaining this decline is the emigra-
tion of many of the unemployed to The
Netherlands, where they may settle as citizens
of the Kingdom without any formalities and
apply for social security that is very genereus
compared to what can be obtained in the
Antilles. Accelerated emigration even caused
a 1.5 per cent drop in Curacao's population
between 1989 and 1991 (BNA 1991).
Up to the 1970s, migration from the An-
tilles to The Netherlands was dominated by
young workers and students. The latter often
returned to their Islands af ter their studies.
However, when the economie Situation wors-
ened female-headed households with young
children and the aged started migrating too.
At the moment there are about 84,000
people of Antillean origin in The Netherlands,
comprising not more than 0.5 per cent of the
Dutch population and 3.8 per cent of the
non-native population. Two-thirds were born
in the Antilles and one-third in The Nether-
lands (Muus 1992). People originating from
Curacao are overrepresented among the An-
tillean immigrants (De Haan et al. 1990).
Migration has risen considerably during the
last decade and return migration is slowing
down (Koot 1979; Koot & Ringeling 1984;
Reubsaet & Kropman 1986). That is why it is
quite conceivable that a bar on the free entry
of Antilleans to The Netherlands will play a
role in the negotiations concerning the com-
plete revision of the Statute. After all, Dutch-
men are already not allowed to settle freely in
the Antilles.
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THE NETHERLANDS IN MAPS
Political affiliation of mayors of municipalities in The Netherlands as of 30 August 1993*
* vacancies assigned according to political affiliation of previous mayor
Christian democratie
party (CDA)
labour party (PvdA)
conservative liberal
party (VVD)
democratie liberal
party (D66)
other parties/
unaffiliated
Sources: Union of Dutch municipalities (VNG) © P. H. Pellenbarg & P. R. A. Terpstra FRW RU Groningen
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